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INTRODUCTION: LOWERING THE AGE RESTRICTION IN THE NATIONAL 
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION TO 18 WILL ALLOW ATHLETES TO RETAIN 
VALUABLE RIGHTS 
 
The National Basketball Association (“NBA”) should lower the age 
restriction for prospective players from 19 (or one year of collegiate/ 
international play) to the age 18. This would allow players who have 
finished playing high school basketball to enter the NBA, creating 
popularity for the NBA, and profit in terms of revenue further developing 
the league. Given the current age restriction in place by the NBA, 
prospective players face several issues, such as limits to the value of their 
individual images, risks of career-ending injuries, and wasted earning 
potential. These issues present real concerns for much of today’s youth 
seeking careers in the NBA as a professional athlete.  
This paper will first review the role of the NBA Players’ Association 
(“NBPA”) current NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). Then, 
an analysis of Antitrust Law and its connection to labor law in the world of 
sports will explain why the age restriction rule in place have been 
problematic for the court system. Finally, this paper will discuss the 
NBPA’s duty of representation towards all athletes and what it can do in 
future negotiations to alleviate legal issues surrounding the age restriction 
rule. It will review the MLB CBA, its draft rules, and farm system. These 
ideas present an opportunity for the NBPA to take ideas from as an 
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analogous system for future negotiations. This will further support the 
conclusion that the NBA should lower the age restriction to 18.  
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: THE NBA AND NBAPA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE.  
 
The history of the NBA is riddled with CBA negotiations and player 
lockouts. The development of the league has led to the growth of player’s 
rights and representation throughout the league. To understand the issues 
surrounding the age-restriction rule, it is important to understand the 
development of the NBPA, and the current CBA in place. 
A.  The development of the NBAPA: Player’s Rights and Representation. 
 
The NBA was established in 1946.
1
 It began with 11 teams, playing a 60 
game schedule.
2
 Several years passed, and the game continued its growth 
seeing players become stars before their very eyes. As star power and 
popularity in the NBA rose, so did player needs, which led to the 
development of the NBPA. 
The NBPA attempted to organize NBA players in 1954.
3
 At this time, 
the NBA had no minimum wage, no health benefits, or pension plans were 
available.
4
 The negotiations, however, were not realized until 1964 when 
                                                 
1
 Lenoard Koppett, NBA HISTORY, 
http://www.nba.com/heritageweek2007/newleague_071207.html (last visited April 30, 
2017). 
2
 Id. 
3
 NBPA, http://nbpa.com/about/ (last visited April 30, 2017). 
4
 Id. 
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the players threatened to strike for the first televised NBA All-Star Game.
5
 
Negotiations continued until 1976 where the NBA and the NBPA reached a 
settlement in the landmark case, Robertson v. National Basketball 
Association.
6
 The role of the NBPA, was to make sure all players’ rights 
were upheld and taken into consideration.
7
 This role continued as the league 
grew. 
By 1980, NBPA’s role in negotiations became essential to the growth of 
the league. The CBA has developed a salary cap, the first of any kind seen 
in professional sports, as well as other league revenue sharing in benefit of 
the players.
8
 Other exceptions such as the Larry Bird Exception (allowing 
teams to exceed the salary cap when signing free agents in limited 
circumstances) have been negotiated by the NBPA.
9
 These exceptions 
allowed players to gain more star power, financial stability, and overall 
power in determining their futures. 
As demonstrated throughout the years of the NBA, the NBPA’s power 
has also grown exponentially. The NBPA’s power for prospective athletes, 
                                                 
5
 NBPA, supra note 3. 
6
 Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
7
 NBPA, supra note 3. 
8
 See, Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and 
Salary Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J 189, 218 (2003).  
9
 Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap Faq., (December 4, 2016), 
http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm.  (last visited April 29, 2017))). Note that the 
application of the Larry Bird exception has several subtle yet complex variations that are 
outside the scope of this article. For a thorough explanation of this exception, see Larry 
coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm (last visited April 29, 
2017).  
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in addition to the current athletes in the NBA has led them to become a 
powerful front in CBA negotiations. The NBPA’s power, has been most 
recently demonstrated through the current CBA negotiations seen below.  
B.  The Current CBA Concerning How Players Enter the League. 
 
As the NBA and the NBPA have grown, so has the CBA explaining 
a variety of topics such as free agency, salary cap restrictions, and 
prospective player eligibility. Vital to the discussion of the age restriction 
rule, is the NBA CBA explanation of Player Eligibility. As cited in the 
current CBA, players who are at least nineteen (19) years of age during the 
calendar year in which the Draft is held are eligible for the draft upon a 
laundry list of other needed qualifications.
10
 Among these qualifications 
include, one (1) NBA Season elapsed since the player’s graduation from 
high school, the player has no further intercollegiate basketball eligibility 
due to attending all four years and graduating from a college or university, a 
player who has allowed four calendar years to elapse since such player’s 
high school graduation, the player in question having signed a player 
contract with a different professional basketball team and has rendered such 
services under a contract prior to January 1, of the immediately preceding 
Draft, expressing desire to be selected in the Draft in writing to the NBA at 
least sixty (60) days prior to the Draft, or if they player is an international 
                                                 
10
 NBA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr32v9qof.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf. 
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player with the guidelines of the CBA.
11
 Thus, the current age restriction 
only allows players who have reached a certain age to participate in the 
NBA.  
The age restriction rule above, reveals the NBPA’s desire to 
negotiate these terms, and thus demonstrate a duty of representation owed 
to prospective athletes. These CBA requirements were negotiated by the 
NBPA, without any acknowledgement by any prospective athletes entering 
the NBA. Therefore, it is vital to take the age-restriction rule seriously.  
THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW AND LABOR LAW AND ITS IMPACT THE 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS WORLD BY LIMITING INCOMING TALENT. 
 
The quarrels over between the NBA, NBPA, and prospective players 
have been well documented throughout time. These issues can be analyzed 
through numerous cases. To first determine whether or not an age-
restriction rule is applicable in a CBA, a court must first determine whether 
or not it a question of antitrust law. If it is determined to be antitrust law, 
then the outcome must be determined similarly to what is found in Denver 
Rockets.
12
 If it is questionable that it is not antitrust law, then the Eighth 
Circuit’s analysis of the Mackey Test to determine if the age-restriction 
should be reviewed by antitrust scrutiny or non-statutory labor exemption.
13
 
Finally, if it is still questionable as to whether or not it is reviewed by the 
                                                 
11
 NBA, supra, note 9.  
12
 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).  
13
 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).  
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non-statutory labor exemption, courts will look at the Second Circuit’s 
Clarett Balancing Test to determine if it should allow an antitrust analysis, 
or if the court’s decision ruling for the prospective athlete will cause federal 
labor law policy issues.
14
  
A.  Antitrust Law Evaluation: the Haywood Method. 
To determine if an age-restriction rule is proper, the first analysis 
must determine whether or not the term falls under antitrust law. Under the 
antitrust law analysis, the age restriction rule may be found invalid. As 
shown through the Denver Rockets case, restrictions imposed on entry into 
a professional sports league through assertions of the rule in question may 
be invalid under antitrust law.
15
  
In the Denver Rockets case, the Ninth Circuit held that it was per se 
illegal to limit eligibility for the NBA draft to those players that were not 
yet four years out of college.
16
 Spencer Haywood, a professional basketball 
player, sought NBA eligibility even though he was not yet a college 
graduate.
17
 Haywood, who was a player who contracted with the Denver 
Rockets in the American Basketball Association (“ABA”), continued to 
pursue a career in the NBA, as contractual disputes continued with the 
Rockets.
18
 Haywood began to seek a contract with the Seattle Supersonics, 
                                                 
14
 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2004).  
15
 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
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but saw the NBA disapproved the contract, citing that he was not yet 
eligible under the four-year college rule established by the NBA rules.
19
 
The provision in question prevented Haywood from contracting with any 
NBA team, causing him to seek an injunction to allow him to sign with 
NBA teams.
20
  
Upon this ruling, Haywood, sought injunctive relief through the 
Ninth Circuit, citing that the rule was in direct violation of Anti-Sherman 
trust Laws.
21
 Upon review, the Court determined that no provision for 
hearings before the four-year college rule existed, therefore, the rule was in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
22
 The Court ruled that partial 
summary judgment limiting the extent of ruling that the four-year college 
rule was improper was granted.
23
  
This case is extremely relevant to the issue of age restrictions, 
because it would be considered a group boycott and concerted refusal to 
deal with any under that age, as demonstrated through the Denver Rockets 
case.
24
 Prospective athletes who are younger than the age of 19, would fall 
into the category of the group boycott, because NBA owners, as a whole, 
would refuse to deal with anyone under that age group. Given that the age 
                                                 
19
 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id.  
24
 Id. 
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restriction is analogous to the previous NBA rule requiring athletes to be 
college graduates to be drafted, a similar court ruling may be gained.  
The NBA, however, may counter that argument by contending that 
the Rule of Reason analysis is justifiable. For the NBA to demonstrate this 
argument, they must provide a legitimate business purpose for the age 
restriction rule, and provide evidence that it is no more restrictive than 
necessary.
25
 As previously argued, this argument by the NBA would most 
likely consist of the need to protect younger athletes, save the league money 
for development of athletes in general, as well as show that the age 
restrictions promotes competitive balance.
26
 This argument will 
nevertheless fail in the eyes of the court because only factors that affect 
economic competition may be considered to determine the legality of a 
restrictive practice under antitrust laws.
27
 Therefore, the NBA could only 
that the product value would decline if the rule is not implemented. This, 
however, has been disproven through the NBA’s growth in the 2000’s with 
players such as LeBron James playing at younger ages than the required age 
limit.
28
 Thus, a Court could find that the proposed rule is subjected to 
                                                 
25
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. 
26
 See, Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An analysis of the Legality of 
Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional 
Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 539.  
27
 National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S.679, 690 (1978).  
28
 See, John Depmsey, “Hoops Droop at ABC,” DAILEY VARIETY, April 12, 2004. The 
article claims that one of the two major reasons the NBA received a $106.5 Million dollar 
increase in its television contract with ESPN and Turner Broadcasting is because of “the 
star power of LeBron James and Carmelo Anthony.” 
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antitrust scrutiny in this scenario and is invalid. 
B.  Non-Statutory Labor Exemption: The Mackey Approach. 
 
 
Although it is arguable that the age-restriction rule may be invalid 
under antitrust scrutiny, several courts have found that an age-restriction 
rule may be protected from antitrust scrutiny by non-statutory labor 
exemptions.
29
 This is because the rule is presumed to be collectively-
bargained.
30
 Given the growth of the CBA, and the role of the NBAPA over 
the history of the league, there is a likelihood that a court would rule in 
favor of the exemption given the Mackey Test.
31
 When first determining if a 
court determined that the age-restriction rule in question should be reviewed 
under a non-statutory labor exemption, one must look at the Mackey Test 
and establish it fits all three prongs.
32
  
If a court were to ask whether or not the age-restriction rule in 
question was protected from antitrust scrutiny, the NBA would need to 
demonstrate that all three prongs of the Mackey Test were established.
33
 
This means that if a prospective player is capable of showing that just one 
of these prongs are not met, the court in question would have to find that the 
                                                 
29
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. 
30
 Id.  
31
 Nicholas E. Wurth, Article: The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the National 
basketball League After the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 3 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 125-127 (2005).  
32
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. 
33
 Id.at 620-623. 
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age-restriction rule in question should be subjected to antitrust scrutiny, and 
therefore is not protected by the non-statutory labor exemption.
34
The first 
prong that must be shown is that the age-restriction is a mandatory subject 
of collective bargaining in this scenario.
35
 The second prong that must be 
established is that it primarily affects only the parties of the collective 
bargaining relationship.
36
 Finally, the last prong that must be shown is that 
the subject in question, age restriction, is a subject that is a bona fide arm’s 
length bargaining item.
37
  
In arguing the first prong, the prospective athlete may argue that he 
is not a member of the collective bargaining relationship, given his inability 
to take part in negotiations. This argument, however, is impractical given 
the standing that prospective athletes are deemed employees under the 
negotiated CBA they enter.
38
 All future players are considered part of the 
negotiations in this instance. 
39
Thus, more likely than not the first prong 
under the Mackey Test, would be met.  
If the first prong under the Mackey Test is easily met, the 
prospective athlete would have to attempt to disprove the second prong. 
Here, it must be found that the age-restriction rule primarily affects only the 
                                                 
34
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. 
38
 Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D. D.C. 1986). 
39
 Id. at 398. 
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parties of the collective bargaining relationship.
40
 This prong, however, has 
also been reviewed by courts. As demonstrated in the Woods case, the 
collective bargaining relationship in the NBA relates to mandatory topics, 
including but not limited to: the draft, conditions of employment such as 
location, and eligibility.
41
 Therefore the second prong is met, so long as the 
term is necessary to the bargaining agreement.
42
 Thus, more likely than not, 
the second prong under the Mackey Test is also met.  
After arguing both the first and second prong under the Mackey 
Test, the last prong is the only way a prospective athlete could attempt to 
show that antitrust scrutiny should be applied. Here, the third prong asks 
whether or not age restriction is a bona fide topic for arm’s length 
bargaining, is reviewed.
43
 Under this analysis, the prospective athlete may 
argue that the rule was not in past collective bargaining relationships, 
therefore it was implemented unilaterally. This argument, however, fails 
given that the NBAPA’s willingness to previously bargain on the topic, 
implements that this topic is for bargaining in all arguments.
44
 Thus, it is 
more likely than not that the second prong under the Mackey Test is also 
met. 
Given that all prongs of the Mackey Test are more likely than not 
                                                 
40
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620-623. 
41
 Wood v. National Basketball Asso., 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).  
42
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620-623. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Wurth, supra note 36, at 127-128. 
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met, the age-restriction rule in courts following the Mackey Test will be 
deemed reviewable under non-statutory labor exemption. If it is found to be 
a non-statutory labor exemption, then a prospective athlete can further 
inquire as to whether or not it is an antitrust violation through the Clarett 
Balancing Test.  
C.  Application of the Clarett Balancing Test 
 
 
Following the Mackey Test, several courts apply a similar balancing 
test as seen in Clarett, to support its decision.
45
This balancing test 
determines whether the antitrust violation would undermine fundamental 
principles of labor law. For the age-restriction rule, it would more likely 
than not stand up to an antitrust charge through this analysis. 
To contend that the Clarett Balancing Test should provide for an 
antitrust scrutiny, the court in question must find that the age-restriction 
would eliminate competition among themselves through selection of a 
collective bargaining representative, that the collective bargaining 
agreement in question provides exclusive assignments of such prospective 
athletes for only a certain team, and that the agreements in question subject 
other prospective athletes to an agreement to adverse circumstances.
46
 This 
can be met through several ways, including that prospective players are 
assigned to teams through a draft, have their rights retained by a particular 
                                                 
45
 Clarett, 369 F.3d. at 124. 
46
 Id. at 127. 
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team for an extended period of time, and that they do not have 
representatives in the CBA negotiations. This argument, however, is 
ultimately flawed, given that the NBA can argue that the federal labor law 
policies in place would suffer.
47
 Thus, this prong tends to favor a non-
statutory labor exemption, and would more likely than not fall in favor of 
the NBA in its attempts to provide an age-restriction rule.  
Under the above analyses, for a prospective athlete to have any 
chance of establishing an antitrust violation existed, one should seek it to be 
either illegal per se, or through a Rule of Reason Analysis. It is clear that 
the age-restriction rule has caused significant issues in the court system, and 
is difficult to comprehend. Given that the age-restriction rule is currently in 
place, the NBAPA should then seek other alternatives to combat the issues 
presented.  
WHAT’S NEXT? HOW THE NBAPA CAN MEET THEIR DUTY OF 
REPRESENTATION TOWARDS PROSPECTIVE ATHLETES BY LOOKING AT OTHER 
THE MLB MODEL. 
 
As this paper has discussed, the NBA, NBPA, and CBA are all 
intertwined. The NBPA, has shown duty to represent all parties, prospective 
athletes and current athletes in such a way that all rights are protected. It is 
vital to note this duty of representation, because as through the above 
analysis of antitrust law and labor law, the collective bargaining process can 
                                                 
47
 Clarett, 369 F.3d. at 127. 
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alter the path a professional sports league. Given the NBPA’s ability in past 
CBA negotiations to relinquish rights of prospective students for the benefit 
of current NBA players, it is now time for the NBPA to look towards the 
future and work towards protecting incoming players as well. For this to 
happen, the NBPA should look at other sports current structures, towards 
inspiration. One sport that the NBA should consider looking at for 
improvement to the current structure is MLB. MLB was founded through 
several leagues starting in 1876 until its present construction.
48
 Throughout 
the years, players have negotiated with teams, contracted with them, and 
have used prospective athletes much like the NBA. The MLB, however, has 
a substantially different stance on the incorporation of players and how they 
develop them over the years. As demonstrated by the rules of the First-Year 
Player Draft, in addition to, the MLB farm system, the MLB provides 
players with numerous opportunities to enter the world of professional 
baseball, regardless of age restrictions.  
A.  The MLB Draft, a System That Provides the NBA with the Best of Both 
Worlds. 
The NBA Draft eligibility is significantly different when compared 
to the MLB Draft eligibility. As outlined above, the NBA restricts the age 
of players who enter into the league to the age of 19.
49
 This is unlike the 
                                                 
48
 MLB HISTORY, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/ (last visited April 30, 2017).  
49
 MLB, Collective Bargaining Agreement, (Jan. 1, 2012), 
http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles/Sports_Law/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agree
ment.pdf.  
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MLB Draft, where there are several times where a prospective athlete can 
enter the MLB Draft. As developed through the MLB First-Year Player 
Draft, there are several scenarios where players may enter into the MLB 
Draft.
50
  
First, high school players are allowed to enter the draft, if they have 
graduated from high school and have not yet attended college or junior 
college.
51
 This is already vastly different from the NBA’s current structure. 
Players who believe they are talented enough to enter the MLB draft are 
provided the opportunity to take this opportunity to determine whether or 
not they wish to pursue a professional career. The player in this scenario, is 
also given the option to sign, or pass on signing the contract provided by the 
MLB team, and pursue higher education.
52
 If the player passes on signing a 
contract with a MLB team, the player can re-enter the draft at a later date.  
The second chance where a player can enter into the MLB draft is 
when he is a college player. A college player may enter the draft having 
either completed their junior or senior years at a college/university, or are at 
least 21 years old.
53
 This is a second option for players, who both have 
previously entered the draft and decided against signing with a team in 
hopes of getting a degree from a college may choose. This option is most 
                                                 
50
 MLB FIRST-YEAR PLAYER DRAFT, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last 
visited April 30, 2017).  
51
 Id. 
52
 MLB, supra note 50. 
53
 Id. 
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similar to what the NBA has in place currently, concerning some form of 
collegiate requirement. This, however, is given to players who have decided 
against signing with a team in the first option, or who did not pursue it.  
A final option for players who seek to enter into the MLB Draft is 
for those who play at a Junior college.
54
 These players are allowed to enter 
the MLB Draft, regardless of how many years of school they have 
completed.
55
 This third option again gives prospective players numerous 
opportunities to seek employment as a professional baseball player. Overall, 
these different opportunities are just some ways the NBPA can look to 
widen the age-restriction rules, while allowing the NBA to continue the 
limitations on what players are eligible to enter the NBA Draft.  
B.  MLB Farm Systems and the NBA D-League Similarities. 
Another way that the NBPA could argue for lowering the age-
restriction rule currently implemented is by utilizing the NBA D-League in 
a way that is similar to the MLB Farm Systems (Minor Leagues). Here, the 
NBPA could argue that the development of the NBA D-League could 
follow the current system in MLB, allowing players to continue 
development in a NBA setting, where the NBA can monitor the 
development of key young players, further grow their fan base, and ideally 
gain profits from additional advertisement.  
                                                 
54
 MLB, supra note 50. 
55
 Id. 
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Under the MLB CBA, a negotiated right of the any MLB Team is 
that they can assign players who are on their rookie contracts to minor 
league clubs.
56
 The MLB Team who assigns the contract of a player to the 
Minor Leagues, will continue to maintain the rights of the player in 
question, but this will provide the player with the opportunity to continue 
development away from the Major Club.
57
 This approach has already begun 
to take place, as the value in the NBA D-League has grown exponentially 
and the number of D-League teams have grown, as just recently 22 teams 
were in play over the 2016-2017 season.
58
Thus, this further provides a way 
for the NBPA to further argue that the age-restriction rule is a further 
impairment on a system that could further both the NBA and NBPA’s 
objectives further.  
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the NBA CBA’s age restriction provides numerous legal issues, 
and questions profitability of the NBA as a whole. Given the previous 
success of players under the age of 20, and the development of the NBA D-
League, the topic of age restrictions in the NBA should be a topic of 
discussion for years to come. If the NBAPA determine that the prospective 
players’ rights are something of value during their next CBA negotiation; it 
                                                 
56
 MLB, supra note 49, at Article XIX, Assignment of Player Contracts.  
57
 Id.  
58
 Jeff Zillgitt, NBA D-League Growing by the Year with 22 Teams in Play for 2016-
17, USA TODAY SPORTS (2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2015/11/12/nba-d-league-growth-30-teams-
within-five-years/75665740/ (last visited April 30, 2017). 
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would strongly favor them to do so, as the growth of the league and the 
profitability of both the players and the D-League depend on it. Thus, the 
age-restriction rule should be lowered from the age of 19, to the age of 18.  
 
